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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENTS -

SYLVANIA ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY

PENN-

CONFESSION PROCEDURE BASED

UPON WAIVER OF NOTICE WITHOUT ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING
BY THE DEBTORS HELD VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Swarb v. Lennox (E.D. Pa. 1970)
Plaintiff brought a class action" in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania requesting the court to declare unconstitutional the Pennsylvania statutes and rules2 providing for the practice of confession of judgment and to restrain the defendants, the Sheriff
of Philadelphia County, the Prothonotary, and fifteen finance companies
who intervened in the action, from operating under those statutes. The
suit challenged the Pennsylvania procedure8 which permits a debtor to
1. The class action was on behalf of all
individual natural persons who are residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and who may be subject to execution of writs by the Sheriff of Philadelphia
County issued upon judgments entered under the acts or rules challenged herein,
or who have had such judgments entered against them by the Prothonotary of
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County under those acts or rules,
or who have signed contracts authorizing such judgments to be entered against
them under those acts or rules even though such judgments may not yet have
been so entered.
Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 1482(111) (1953); PA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 738-39 (1953)
PA. R. Civ. P. 2950-76.
3. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 1482(111) (1953) ; PA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 738-39 (1953);
PA. R. CIV. P. 2950-76. The most important Pennsylvania statutory authority for
the use of judgment notes is contained in PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 739 (1953), which
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record, within this Commonwealth, on the application of any person, being the original holder (or assignee
of such holder) of a note, bond, or other instrument of writing, in which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant for an attorney at law, or other
person, to confess judgment, to enter judgment against the person or persons
who executed the same, for the amount which from the fact of the instrument
may appear to be due, without the agency of any attorney, or declaration filed,
with such stay of execution as may be therein mentioned, for the fee of one
dollar, to be paid by the defendant; particularly entering on his docket the date
and tenor of the instrument of writing on which the judgment may be founded,
which shall have the same force and effect as if a declaration had been filed,
and judgment confessed by an attorney, or judgment obtained in open court and
in term time; and the defendant shall not be compelled to pay any costs, or
fee to the plaintiff's attorney, when the judgment is entered on any instrument
of writing as aforesaid ....
Although Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2958 now mandates that
within twenty days after the entry of judgment by confession, the plaintiff must

(571)
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sign an agreement containing a clause 4 authorizing the prothonotary, court
clerk or any attorney to appear in any court, at any time, to confess judgment against the debtor for any unpaid portion of the debt along with
various fees and charges. In granting plaintiff's motion for a temporary
restraining order, 5 the court held that the Pennsylvania confession of
judgment procedure, based upon waiver of notice and hearing without
adequate understanding by the debtors, is violative of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, the holding limited relief
to individual residents of Pennsylvania earning less than $10,000 per
year who sign confession of judgment clauses contained in leases and
consumer finance agreements other than bonds and warrants of attorney
accompanying mortgages. 6 Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D.
7
Pa. 1970).
Confession of judgment is "[t]he act of a debtor in permitting judgment to be entered against him by his creditor, for a stipulated sum, by a
written statement to that effect or by warrant of attorney, without the institution of legal proceedings of any kind .

. . ." The vast majority of
mail to the defendant written notice of such entry, faliure to so inform does not
affect the lien of the judgment and the defendant will still remain burdened by this
restraint on his

property. Furthermore the plaintiff may issue a writ of execution
even if the notice has not been filed, although no further proceedings may be had
until notice is finally given.
4. A typical clause reads as follows:
Each buyer and co-buyer, jointly and severally, hereby authorize and empower
the Prothonotary, Clerk or any attorney, or any court of record within the United
States or elsewhere, at any time, to appear for each buyer and a co-buyer and to
confess judgment as often as necessary against each buyer and of co-buyer and
in favor of the holder, as of any term, with or without declaration filed for
such sum or sums as may be payable hereunder with the cost of suit with 20
per cent added as attorney's fees. With respect to any judgment and exemption
under any law now or hereafter in force, and each hereby agrees that real estate
may be sold under a writ or execution and voluntarily condemns the same and
authorize the Prothonotary or Clerk to enter said condemnation or such writ;
and each buyer and co-buyer agrees that a true copy hereof, verified by affidavit
made by the holder or someone acting on its behalf, may be filed in such proceeding in lieu of filing the original as warrant of attorney, any rule of court,
custom to practice to the contrary notwithstanding. Any judgment entered hereon
or of any prior note for which the note is in whole or in part mediately or
immediately renewal shall be secured, security for the payment hereof and of any
future note which is in whole or in part mediately or immediately renewal hereof.
314 F. Supp. at 1097 n.14.
5. The temporary restraining order terminated November 1, 1970 and was
modified to prevent the entry of judgments by confession against the described class
on documents signed after the date of the final order. 314 F. Supp. at 1101, 1103.
6. Judge Weiner, concurring and dissenting in part, found the Pennsylvania
procedure unconstitutional as applied to all members of the class on behalf of whom
the suit had been instituted irrespective of whether or not their income exceeds $10,000.
7. Appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3072 (U.S. Aug. 14, 1970) (No. 538).
8. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 978 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). See O'Hara v. Manley,
140 Pa. Super. 39, 44, 12 A.2d 820, 822 (1940). See generally 3 A. FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 1302 (5th ed. 1925).
Today, judgment may be confessed in favor of a creditor prior to the commencement of any court action through the use of a warrant of attorney incorporated
into a debt instrument. See Note, Cognovit Judgments Under Fire in New York:
Right Answer, Wrong Reason?, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 197 & n.4 (1969). The confession of judgment clause may be a single provision within the debt instrument
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jurisdictions in the United States have rendered decisions or passed
legislation eliminating confession of judgment or severely restricting its
use. 9 In only three states, including Pennsylvania, is the practice widespread in consumer transactions.' 0 Although the applicable statutory section
or it may constitute a separate document altogether. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.2906 (1962). Tt is usually found, however, in combination with a provision
whereby the debtor waives notice and service of process. See Hopson, Cognovit
Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U.
CH. L. REV. 111 (1961). The typical judgment note authorizes any attorney to
appear in any court of record on behalf of the debtor and confess judgment in the
debtor's name in favor of the creditor or holder of the instrument of indebtedness.
The warrant of attorney may be broader or more restricted. It may authorize any
person (not only an attorney) to appear in any court (not only in the court of record).
See 3 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1302 (5th ed. 1925). Confession of judgment clauses
can be found in real or personal property leases, in promissory notes and, most often
in retail installment contracts. These clauses may serve as collateral security on a
bond or mortgage, or may be used in place of a mortgage. See Hopson, supra, at
119 n.50; Oldfather, Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review of the Adhesion
Contractor's Lawmaking, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 303, 321 n.83 (1968) ; Tanner,
Uniformity of Judgment Notes in Pennsylvania, 44 DICK. L. REv. 173, 177-78, 180-81
(1940); Note, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 524 n.3 (1954). See
also Note, Cognovit Judgments Under Fire in New York, supra, at 198.
9. Eleven states declare such judgments void and unenforceable. ALA. CODE
tit. 20, § 16 (1958); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-143 (1956); FLA. STAT. § 55.05
(1959) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 110-601 (1933) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.140 (1955) ;
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 13a (1959); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1545 (1942);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 13-811 (1947); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:6-9 (1951); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 25-201 (1955) ; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2224 (1959). Two other
states go even further and make the execution of such a clause a criminal misdemeanor. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2906 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-9-16, 21-9-18
(1953). Twenty-four states have either effectively abolished the use of confession of
judgment or have eliminated its attractiveness by placing various procedural limitations on the practice. ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.050 (1962) and ALASKA R. CIV. P. 57(c)
(1962) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-301 to -303 (1948) ; CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. §§ 1132-35
(West 1955) as anended (West Supp. 1968-69); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-193
to 195 (1958) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 10-901 to -904 (1947) ; IOWA CODE §§ 676.1-.4
(1958) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-105 (1964); LA. CONST. art. 7, § 44 (1955); MD.
ANN. CODE, GEN. R. PR. AND P. 645 (1947); MINN. STAT. §§ 548.22-.23 (1957);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 511.070-.100 (1949) ; NEB. Rhv. STAT. tit. 2, §§ 17.090-.110 (1967) ;
NEW YORK Civ. PRAC. L. AND R. § 3218 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-247
to -249 (1944); N.D. R. Civ. P. 68(c); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 689-695 (1960);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 26.010-.130 (1961) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1535 to -1538 (1962);
S.D. CoMp. LAW tit. 21, ch. 26-1 to -5 (1967); UTAH R. Civ. P. 58A(e) (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4671 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.60.010-.070
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-5 (1966). Four states, although having no
general legislation on point, do prohibit confessed judgment clauses in particular
situations. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-16-6 (1963) (void in retail installment contracts);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3084 (1964) (prohibited in loans of $2000 or less);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 361-A:7(VIII) (1966) (retail installment contracts)
and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 399-A:5(II) (1968) (small loans); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 19-25-24 (1968) (small loans). Of the remaining states which generally permit
the procedure, three specifically prohibit its use in small loan situations. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 2306 (1953); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-3 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, § 50(3) (Smith-Hurd 1968) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2906 (1962); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Baldwin 1968); PA. STAT. tit. 12 § 739 (1953); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8-355 to -356 (1950); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 270-69 (1958); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-309 to -313 (1957). But see MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 23,667(12) (1962)
as amended (1963) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-283 (1966) ; Wis. STAT. § 214.14 (1957).
10. The other two states are Ohio and Illinois. These three states are responsible
for producing the vast majority of confessed judgments in the United States today.
See Hopson, supra note 8, at 115; Note, Confessions of Judgment, supra note 8, at
524-25; Note, Cognovit Judgments Under Fire In New York, supra note 8, at 200.
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has been strictly construed, 11 until the instant case, the Pennsylvania courts
have permitted this practice to survive.' 2 Thus Swarb represents the first
overturning of this 164 year old Pennsylvania practice by declaring that
the Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure may be unconstitutional in certain circumstances.
In delineating the circumstances in which a confession of judgment
clause may be unconstitutionl, the court initially limited its holding to
those situations where there has been a waiver of notice without adequate
understanding by the debtor, stating that the procedure does comply
with "the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provided that
there has been an understanding and voluntary consent of the debtor in
signing the document containing the confession of judgment clause."' 3
The court's rationale for this position was that absent a knowing waiver
due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
entry of judgment. 14 Upon examination of the evidence presented in the
instant case, the court found that there had not been an understanding
consent by the members of the class on whose behalf the suit was
brought. 15 Furthermore, after making this determination, the court stated
that it was not its function "to dictate to a state exactly what constitutes
understanding waiver of notice in each particular case and what proof of
such notice would comply . . . [with Supreme Court standards]."16 Thus,

the court has not declared confessions of judgment unconstitutional per se,
but rather mandates that courts must proceed on a case by case basis to
determine whether there has been an adequate understanding by the debtor
that he has relinquished his constitutional rights.
11. See, e.g., Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4-5, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953),
where the court stated:
A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the most powerful
and drastic document known to civil law. The signer deprives himself of every
defense and every delay of execution, he waives exemption of personal property
from levy and sale under the exemption laws, he places his cause in the hands
of a hostile defender. . . . For that reason the law jealously insists on proof
that this helplessness and impoverishment was involuntarily accepted and consciously assumed.
See also Solazo v. Boyle, 365 Pa. 586, 76 A.2d 179 (1950) ; Dime Bank & Trust Co.
v. O'Boyle, 334 Pa. 500, 6 A.2d 106 (1939) ; Deibert v. Rhodes, 291 Pa. 550, 140 A.
515 (1928) ; Sterling Elec. & Furn. Co. v. Mitchell, 179 Pa. Super. 517, 118 A.2d 280
(1956) ; Biglerville Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 80 York County L. Rep. 62 (1966).
12. As one author views the situation: "Undoubtedly early history and long
standing custom, lobbying skill and the folklore as to the proper relationship of debtor
and creditor all play a role." Hopson, supra note 8, at 116.
13. 314 F. Supp. at 1095.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1100. The court characterized the evidence as indicative of the fact
that these debtors did not fully understand the rights they were relinquishing. These
rights included the right to have notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to judgment, the right to have the burden of proving default resting upon the creditor and the
right to avoid the additional expense of attorney's fees and other incidental costs.
16. Id. The standard is that for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege." See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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Although Swarb predicated the effectiveness of a constitutional waiver
conjunctively upon the requirements of knowledge and voluntariness, 17
the court rested its holding solely upon the absence of knowledge. 18 Apparently, it was felt that the absence of either factor rendered the procedure
constitutionally infirm. Since the court was satisfied that the evidence
offered showed a lack of understanding of the evisceration of due process
rights, its inquiry into waiver was ended. Although this maneuver
is logically permissible, its primary significance is that it allowed the court
to avoid the more difficult issue of the voluntariness of the relinquishment
of notice and hearing.
It is submitted, however, that the involuntariness of the procedure is a
sufficient ground upon which to predicate a holding of unconstitutionality.
Contracts of adhesion, unilaterally drafted by a dominant party and
presented to one in an inferior position as the only acceptable instrument,
are involuntary since the stronger party forces his conditions upon the
other, and the weaker has no choice but to accede to those terms. Demonstrably, the practice of confession of judgment is adhesive in Pennsylvania because there is no "viable alternative to the judgment note for
the low, marginal and middle income consumer,"' 9 and thus, any such
consumer who desires to purchase on credit must sign the judgment note
or do without the goods.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has recently taken judicial notice of the fact that form leases in
landlord-tenant agreements are put before tenants on a non-negotiable
basis.2 0 In holding that a prejudgment seizure and sale of personal
property without a hearing to compensate for unpaid rent is violative of
due process, the court in Santiago v. McElroy2l emphasized that in the
present urban housing situation there is no freedom to contract but only
the imposition of the terms of the contract upon the tenant. 22
This aspect of the lease agreement under attack in Santiago is closely
analogous to the financing agreement involved in Swarb, since both contracts present situations which leave no practical alternatives to those
who are forced to sign them. It follows, therefore, that the rationale
underlying the finding of involuntariness in Santiago is equally applicable
to the Swarb case and, although it has been repeatedly contended that the
debtor's signature on the judgment note constitutes a waiver of notice and
17. 314 F. Supp. at 1095.
18. Id.
19. Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail Install-

ment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 Dicx. L. REv. 115, 116-17 (1968).

20. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
21. 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
22. Id. at 294.
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hearing, it is submitted that because of the adhesive nature of the con24
23
fession of judgment agreement any consent to this waiver is fictitious.
Additionally, it should be noted that the Swarb court, in recognizing
that there is "no presumption that a person acquiesces in the waiver of his
constitutional rights," took the position that the burden of coming forward
23. Although the Swarb court based its decision on the due process requirements
of an intelligent waiver of notice and right to a hearing, state courts can avoid the

constitutional issue and declare confession of judgment contracts unconscionable since
the consumer's decision to sign such an agreement is not obtained voluntarily but
rather through adhesion. The "adhesion" contract is a standardized or form agreement that is drafted unilaterally by a dominant party and then presented to a weaker
party as the only acceptable instrument. See Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion
Contracts, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 125, 128 (1962). The procedure under which these judgments are confessed is one which developed during a period when credit was an
institution taken advantage of only by businessmen who were, more often than not,
represented by counsel and wise in the ways of commercial borrowing. Now, however,
credit is available to all members of society in all sorts of commercial transactions.
Today's consumer who is told to sign a financing contract, in general, not only has
no knowledge that he is waiving a constitutional right, but moreover, he often has no
choice. For the "low, marginal and middle income consumers," credit is indispensable
and their lack of bargaining power clearly indicates the need for consumer protection.
For this protection, the state courts can use the Uniform Commercial Code
as legislative authority upon which to base a holding that confession of judgment
clauses are void. PA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1953). The drafters of the
Code, cognizant of the problems inherent in contracts of adhesion, included a section
pertaining to unconscionability in sales contracts. Section 2-302 provides that if the
court finds the contract or any part of it to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause. Furthermore, in determining whether or not the contract is unconscionable, the official Comment to this
section adds that "[t]he basic test [of unconscionability] is whether, in the light of
the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. . . . The principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-302, Comment 1. Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.
1948). The obvious import of this language is that the prime considerations in
measuring unconscionability are the characteristics of adhesion. The Swarb court
found that "the low income consumer neither anticipates such clauses in consumer
contracts nor understands such clauses," and quoted extensively with approval
numerous sources supporting this proposition. 314 F. Supp. at 1099. See Pyes,
Reappraisal of the Confession of Judgment Law, 48 ILL. B.J. 764, 769 (1960), where
the author states that "[firom a practical viewpoint . . . many debtors are oblivious
of the fact that they are signing anything except a credit application. In other
instances, where they are aware they are signing a note, they are completely unaware
that the effect of this action is to waive their day in Court." See Cutler Corp. v.
Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 8, 97 A.2d 234, 238 (1953) ("a device not ordinarily expected
by a homeowner in a simple agreement for alterations and repairs.") ; Shuchman,
Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, supra, at 134; Comment, supra note 19, at
116, 118. See generally Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer
Credit Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 409, 427 (1967) ; Hopson, supra note 8,
at 115, 131; Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit,
8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 441, 445 (1967) ; Willier, Protection Installment Buyers
Didn't Get, 2 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 287, 295 (1961); Note, Installment Sales:
Plight of the Low Income Buyer, 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROD. 1, 3 (1966). Thus,
applying the Uniform Commercial Code to confessions of judgment, it is submitted
that such a clause in a consumer sales contract could be declared unconscionable
and thus rendered ineffectual by the courts. If this result obtained, a likely reaction
of creditors would be to separate the contract and the judgment note, thus attempting
to bring the confession of judgment feature outside the operation of Article Two of
the Code, dealing with sales of goods. However, if the Swarb rationale that the
entire consumer transaction is the focus of inquiry be adopted, the debtor should be
allowed to come forward with proof that the note and contract constitute an inextricable consumer transaction and therefore come within the purview of Article Two.
24. Comment, supra note 19, at 118.
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with proof of understanding is on the creditor. 25 Moreover, the debtor's
signature alone would not seem to satisfy this burden since Swarb focused
its inquiry upon evidence that these debtors had no understanding of the
operation of Pennsylvania procedure. 26
The court's position that one can waive his constitutional rights if there
is an adequate understanding of the consequences is clearly correct.2 7 However, since the Pennsylvania procedure can produce such gross inequities,
it is submitted that the courts should demand an extremely high burden of
proof of cognizant waiver. Thus, if in the light of Swarb, a creditor purports to meet this burden by producing a signed affidavit of understanding,
or by having the note signed in the clerk's office of the local court,28 or
having it confessed in a separate instrument, 29 these and other innovative
techniques, standing alone, should not be deemed sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional requirements.8 0
The Swarb court further limited its relief to Pennsylvania residents
having incomes of less than $10,000 a year, since there was no showing
that the plaintiffs in the class action were "representative parties who
fairly and adequately protect the interest of persons signing confession of
judgment notes who have incomes of over $10,000. ' ' 3 l Moreover, the court

conceded that its holding may make it more difficult for those affected by
the decision to secure credit and consequently saw no necessity for extending such consequences to persons not fairly represented in the
action.32 Finally, the court added further support to its limitation by
mentioning that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a determination of the proper class in a class action.88
25. 314 F. Supp. at 1100. See note 15 supra.
26. Id. at 1099 & n.21. See note 15 supra.
27. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 1551 (1956).
29. See, e.g., MIcH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. tit. 27A, § 2906 (1967).
30. But see Comment, supra note 19, at 123.
31. 314 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
32. Id. at 1099.
33. Id. at 1099. The court relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) (1)
which provides that as soon as practicable after the commencement of the class action,
itis the function of the court to determine whether this action is to be maintained.
Thus, the court found a procedural basis upon which to make an explicit determination of the extent of the class to which relief is to be granted. Furthermore, the
court drew more support for its position from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(c) (4) which allows the class action to be maintained with respect to particular
issues and allows a class to be subdivided into subclasses. This action by the court
raises a question as to the proper functioning and scope of rule 23. Although this
determination should be made as soon as possible after the commencement of the
action, the timing factor must necessarily vary from case to case. See Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1967);
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 41
(1967) ; 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.50, at 23-1102 (2d ed. 1969). Therefore, it was within the broad discretion of the court to examine the facts of the case
before making this determination, and it cannot be said that it abused this discretion
by limiting the class to which relief is to be granted in the holding of the case.
The court was also justified in relying upon rule 23(c) (4) to limit this
class. An illustration of where this is permissible is ". . . a class that includes subclasses with divergent interests, or where certain representatives adequately represent
only one group and other representatives represent another group." 3B J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE fr 23.65, at 23-1251 (2d ed. 1969). Thus, once making the deter-
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Although it is true that empirical studies have shown that a great
percentage of those who sign confession of judgment clauses earn less
than $10,000 per year,3 4 and that the uneducated, poor and the elderly
are the most frequent objects of fraudulent exploitation, S5 it is equally
true that the better educated and wealthy are also fraught with similar
problems.3 6 Thus, in denying relief to those persons who earn more than
$10,000, the court appears to have accepted the contention that there exists
some correlation between income level and consumer intelligence, a correlation of questionable validity.
It is submitted that the court's correlation, while perhaps possessing
coincidental accuracy, has no causative validity. The $10,000 figure set by
the court purports to provide constitutional protection to a class of
persons needing it most. However, both in fact and in theory the basis
of this limitation is unsound and the efficacy of its practical application
is questionable. Although initially there appears to be a strong correlation
between education and income,3 7 this relationship is only valid as a
general proposition and is non-existent in numerous specific instances. In
1967, for example, the median annual income for males over twenty-five
years of age and with five or more years of college education exceeded
$10,000 but over forty-three percent of this group earned less than
$10,000.' s Similarly, teachers" and professionals, including attorneys, accountants, chemists and engineers on the average earned below $10,000.40
Moreover, the theoretical basis of any such correlation is equally mismination that the plaintiffs in the instant case did not fairly represent the interests
of those earning over $10,000, the court had at its disposal rule 23(c)(4).
34. Part of the opinion was based on a study which showed that in a representative sample of those who signed confession of judgment notes only four percent

earned more than $10,000. See D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE (a study
prepared by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, February,

1968); 314 F. Supp. at 1097 & n.15.

35. Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE 143 (1965). See
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 34.
36. An important trade union officer, high in the councils of the labor movement
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania admitted to me readily that he has on
at least a half dozen occasions been the victim of such high pressure salesmanship at a time when he himself was engaged in lecturing trade union audiences
about the need for exercising care and caution in entering into installment
sales agreements.
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Commercial Credit Financing Fields, Pursuant to Senate Resolution, Serial No. 4,
Sess. 1962, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 15, 1963, at 13 (the "Donolow Committee Hearings;" testimony of Harry Boyer, President, Pennsylvania AFL-CIO).
See Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs
for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395 n.9 (1966).
37. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

also D.

UNITED STATES:

1969, 108 (90th ed.).

38. Id.
39. Id. at 119. In 1969 the average annual salary for secondary school teachers
was $8160. In 1968, 98.6 percent of those persons teaching in secondary schools had
a bachelor's degree or higher. Thus any correlation between education and income
in this particular area of employment is clearly demonstrated to be infirm. Furthermore, on the college level, in 1969 all ranks of professors earned, on an average,
slightly above $10,000 while those below the rank of associate professor earned
considerably less. Id. at 125.
40. Id. at 327. The median annual income in 1967 of professional, technical and
kindred workers was $9370.
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leading. The court in establishing this limitation apparently assumes that
education, which it feels is directly proportional to income, is the determinative factor in establishing consumer wisdom. The real inquiry, how41
It
ever, is whether there is an understanding of the rights relinquished.
seems indisputable that education is not wholly dispositive of the question
of understanding and therefore the court's approach appears unduly
restrictive. Finally, the court, in effect, denied constitutional protection to
a class of persons earning more than $10,000 and thus engaged in a
presumption of waiver of constitutional rights, a presumption which it
42
had expressly rejected in referring to the low-income consumer.
The court's belief that the consumer might have a more difficult time
securing credit absent the availability of confession of judgment procedures
lent further support to its conclusion that the holding should not be extended beyond the $10,000 limitation. 4 This position is difficult to justify
since the consumer with a higher income ordinarily does not need the
confession of judgment vehicle in order to secure credit. Moreover, there
is no evidence that consumers in the states that prohibit the practice have
experienced difficulties securing credit as a result of the unavailability of
the confession of judgment procedure. 44 Furthermore, the position of the
Swarb court would offer such a consumer credit but deny him the relief
granted his poorer counterpart and leave him unfairly prejudiced by the
confession of judgment operation. In short, the court appears to have
hinged the protection of the Constitution upon the income of those seeking
its protection. A long line of Supreme Court decisions reject this contention. 45 Finally, the court failed to recognize the practical problems
which will result from this aspect of its holding. One effect of the $10,000
limit is that creditors, in order to bring themselves entirely outside the
holding of the case, will, in all likelihood, now demand affidavits of
income of more than $10,000 from prospective consumers. This will put
pressure upon those within the ambit of the court's decision to be
accepted by their potential creditors, thereby serving to frustrate the intent
of the case's impact. Moreover, those charged with implementing the
Pennsylvania procedure 46 will now have the overwhelming burden of
establishing the financial status of signatories to these contracts. Thus,
the monetary limitation in the Swarb holding is based upon misleading
41. See p. 577 supra.
42. 314 F. Supp. at 1100. See p. 580 infra.
43. Id.
44. See Note, Confessions of Judgment,supra note 8, at 537-38.
45. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also p. 585 &
notes 80 & 81 infra.
The question whether the principles of these cases, which dealt with criminal
justice, can be applied in civil actions was affirmatively answered in Jeffreys v.
Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968), where it was held that
a statute requiring service of process by publication in a divorce action based upon
abandonment operated as an effective barrier to the indigent plaintiffs' access to the
courts and denied them equal protection of the laws.
46. See text quoted in notes 3 & 4 supro.
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statistics, appears constitutionally unsound and lacks an awareness of
practical realities.
Finally, the holding only extended relief to consumers signing leases
and consumer finance agreements other than bonds and warrants of attorney accompanying mortgages. 47 The court reasoned that plaintiffs'
evidence did not justify a finding that contracts other than notes used in
consumer transactions, 4 including leases and consumer loans, are signed
by the consumers without an understanding of the significance of a
confession of judgment clause contained therein. In the mortgage situation, for instance, the court noted that the confession of judgment is
signed at a title company settlement with the mortgagor's lawyer present,
and that there must affirmatively be called to the mortgagor's attention the
fact that he is subjecting his home to a lien and is given three days in
which to rescind the transaction. 49 However, a better explanation of the
holding's limitation is that the policy of the Swarb court was to formulate
a rule of constitutional law no "broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied." 50 This policy has sound precedent 5 ' but
limited foresight. Although the court's conclusion as to the adequate
understanding of the signatories to these exempted agreements may generally be valid and although the procedure followed in these situations may
tend to establish a knowing waiver, nevertheless, the result is, in effect,
a presumption by the court that these particular debtors have intelligently
waived their constitutional rights. It is submitted that the court has
again 52 contravened standards established by the Supreme Court 53 and
ignored its own express affirmation that there can be no presumption of
54
acquiescence in the waiver of constitutional rights.
Two more potential problems should be noted. The question arises
whether a judgment note separate from the contract of purchase would
be accepted by the court as a "consumer transaction" and thus within
the protection of its holding. This question becomes significant because
creditors, seeking to minimize the impact of the decision, may attempt
47. 314 F. Supp. at 1098.
48. By "consumer transactions" the court included those in which the party to

whom credit is extended is "a natural person and in which the money, property or
services which are the subject of the credit transaction are primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes." 314 F. Supp. at 1098 n.16. See also Moo, Legislative
Control of Consumer Credit Transactions,33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 656, 665 (1968).
49. 314 F. Supp. at 1098. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.9, .202 (Supp. 1970).
50. 314 F. Supp. at 1098, citing Steamship Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113

U.S. 33, 39 (1885). It is interesting to note that although the Swarb court explicitly
espoused to this policy in addressing itself to the question of bonds and warrants of
attorney accompanying mortgages, it nevertheless seemed to have ignored the policy
with regard to leases. While the holding of the court specifically included lease
transactions, it does not appear on the record that the applicability of the confession
of judgment procedure to such leases was ever put in issue.
51. See, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1966); CIO v.

McAdory, 325 U.S. 472, 475 (1945).
52. See p. 579 supra.
53. See note 16 supra. See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 70-71
(1942); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (193D).
54. 314 F. Supp. at 1100.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/6

10

Editors: Recent Developments
MARCH

1971]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

this separation and argue that the judgment note is distinct from the
contract and therefore not within the scope of the rule announced in
Swarb. The court never specifically addressed itself to this problem, but
it is nevertheless implicit in its language that such a contention would
be unsupportable. 5
Finally, it should be noted that language in the court's opinion includes
leases in the definition of what constitutes a consumer transaction. 5" In
Pennsylvania, it is well-settled that a lease is not a consumer transaction
but rather is a conveyance of an interest in land.57 Since the Swarb court
never elaborated upon this language, perhaps the best explanation of
this development is that the statement is unintentionally overbroad and that
the court did not purport to modernize Pennsylvania landlord-tenant law.
The Swarb court placed great reliance on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.58 Since

the court did not

articulate the basis for this reliance, extensive inquiry into the rationale
underlying Sniadach is necessitated. Sniadach held that a Wisconsin statute
providing for prejudgment garnishment of wages was unconstitutional
because it deprived consumers of property without due process of law.
The Court concluded that:
[W]here the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no
extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing
this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental
principles of due process. 59
55. See, e.g., id. at 1098, where the court's language characterized such notes as

"incident to consumer transactions and consumer financing ;" see note 48 supra.

56. See, e.g., id. at 1098, where the court described judgment notes as being ...
used in consumer transactions, including leases ..
"
57. See, e.g., Morrisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 381 Pa.
576, 582, 112 A,2d 183, 186 (1955).
58. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). For a thorough discussion of the Sniadach opinion, see
Comment, Prejudgment Wage Garnishment: Notice and Hearing Requirements
under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 462 (1970);
Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 837 (1970) ; Note, Some Implications of Sniadach,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1970); Note, 72 W. VA. L. REV. 165 (1970) ; Note, 1970
Wisc. L. REv. 181 (1970).
As recently as March 1970, in the case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), the Supreme Court held that the due process clause prohibits a state from
terminating welfare payments without first giving the recipient an opportunity to
appear personally, with counsel, to offer evidence, and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. For a thorough treatment of Goldberg v. Kelly, see Note, 16 VILL. L.
REv. 587 (1971) infra. Similarly, in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the
Court held that the failure to give a father notice of pending adoption proceedings
of his child violated the most rudimentary demands of due process. Furthermore, the
Armstrong Court noted that the infirmity was not cured by the subsequent hearing
because of the shift of the burden of proof which would not have been imposed on
the natural father had he been given due notice at the start of the proceedings. See
also Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927); see generally Hopson, supra note 8, at .140-43; Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1257
(1957) ; Note, 32 IND. L.J. 469 (1957).
59. 395 U.S. at 341-42. Although in his opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice
Douglas several times couched his analysis in terms of "procedural due process," the
above sentence quoted in the text which expresses a violation of fundamental due
process provoked a ". . . biting dissent from Mr. Justice Black charging that in the
last analysis the Court's decision was based on its view that the Wisconsin statute
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The Sniadach decision has already begun to influence lower courts" ° in
reviewing ex parte procedures in light of due process considerations. Indeed, one commentator has praised the decision as having done more to
help the consumer than the Truth in Lending Law.6 '
Whether the confession of judgment procedure in the present case
falls within the purview of Sniadach is dependent upon three factors:
(1) whether the procedural scheme of the statute involved in Swarb is
sufficiently similar to that found in Sniadach to warrant application of the
same considerations; (2) whether the facts in Swarb compel its inclusion
within the carefully drawn requirements expressed in Sniadach; and (3)
whether Sniadach's rationale in invalidating prejudgment garnishment
of wages can be extended to the taking of other kinds of personal
property.
In addition to the acquisition of quasi in rem jurisdiction over a
defendant whose property is located within the state of the forum, a
primary purpose of attachment or garnishment is providing security for
satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, should he ultimately prevail. 6 -' Procedurally, a typical prejudgment garnishment statute involves the seizure of
the defendant's assets without a hearing.63 The defendant is thus deprived
of his property until he contests the claim against him on the merits.
The difficulties are compounded, however, in a judgment by confession,
since judgment has been entered against the debtor and his property
subjected to seizure before the debtor can even begin to contest the
claim in court. It should be noted that, contrary to arguments advanced
by finance companies and other creditors in support of the confession of
judgment, the basic constitutional deficiencies are not cured simply because it is theoretically possible for the consumer to file a petition to
open or to strike the judgment. 64 When petitioning to open judgment, the
burden is placed upon the debtor, who is considered the proponent of
the claim, to convince the court of the need for equitable relief. 65 If he

does seek to open judgment, the debtor must then proceed on depositions,6 6
was 'bad state policy' and that the Court was thus improperly acting as a superlegislature." Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, supra note 58, at 944-45.

60. See, e.g., Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969) ; cf. Laprease v. Raymours Furn. Co., Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 2082
(N.D.N.Y. Jul. 29, 1970); Klim v. Jones, 39 U.S.L.W. 2060 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 17, 1970).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V, 1970?. See'Sheller, Truth in Lending - The
Consumer Point of View, 41 PA. B. Ass N Q. 55, 56 (1969). For an informative
discussion of the Truth in Lending Act and its relation to judgments by confession,
see Note, 1970 Wisc. L. REV. 216 (1970).
62. Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, supra note 58, at 946.
63. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267 (1957).
64. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). See note 58 supra.
65. See Ahrens v. Goldstein, 376 Pa. 114, 102 A.2d 164 (1954) ; Lukac v. Morris,
108 Pa. Super. 453, 164 A. 834 (1933). See also P. SHUCHMAN, HANDBOOK ON THE
USE OF JUDGMENT NOTES IN PENNSYLVANIA § 41.2 (1961), where the author states:
The burden is on the petitioner to make out a case which will justify action by
the judge sitting as chancellor. Clearly a mere conflict of evidence is insufficient.
There must not only be a preponderance of evidence to support the rule, but it
must carry such a conviction of truth as to assure the court that the judgment
should be opened and a jury trial awarded....
66. PA. R. Civ. P. 209. See Kine v. Forman, 404 Pa. 301, 172 A.2d 164 (1961).
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carry a heavy burden of proof and attempt to meet this burden before a
judge who will decide the case only upon a transcript of depositions and
who therefore will have no opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. 67 The entire procedure thus affords even the more knowledgeable debtor less chance of success than were he afforded a hearing prior to
the entry of a judgment. Thus, it is clear that the difficulties encountered
by a defendant in a confession of judgment situation are, at least, no less
burdensome than those which confront one whose property has been
seized through prejudgment garnishment or attachment. Therefore, the
rationale underlying the invalidation of the prejudgment garnishment
statute in Sniadach should apply with equal force to the confession of
judgment statute in Pennsylvania.
The threshold problem in deciding the second issue involves the express language by the Court in Sniadach negating any inference that
restraint upon or interference with the defendant's property before a
hearing necessarily constitutes a deprivation of property without due
process. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that:
Such summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due

process in extraordinary situations. .

.

. But in the present case no

situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest
is presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly
drawn to meet any such unusual condition. Petitioner was a resident
of this Wisconsin community and in personam jurisdiction was
readily obtainable. 68
A comparison of the factual settings of both cases indicates that
Swarb should fit squarely within the carefully drawn language of Justice
Douglas. Neither case involved an "extraordinary" situation "requiring
special protection to a state or creditor interest;"69 since both involved
simply consumer financing arrangements. Furthermore, Pennsylvania's
statute is drawn equally as broad as the Wisconsin act and therefore is
equally unable to "meet any such unusual condition. ' 70 Finally, as in
Sniadach, the plaintiffs in Swarb were residents of the forum state upon
whom "in personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable."'71
67. 314 F. Supp. at 1095.
68. 395 U.S. at 339.
69. In Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), a case involving creditors' rights,
the Court emphasized the fact of heavy regulations imposed upon banks and noted
that the savings and loan associations participating in the case were created, insured
and aided by the Federal Government.
In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), the Court constitutionally upheld a portion of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 334(a) (Supp. III, 1964), which authorizes the seizure of misbranded articles believed to be dangerous to health, fraudulently mislabelled or materially misleading.
Both cases involved the summary seizure of private property prior to a
hearing and both involved situations in which it was necessary to protect a special
state or creditor interest.
For a thorough treatment of these cases and the others cited in Sniadach,
see Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, supra note 58, at 947-49.
70. See text of note 3 supra.
71. 395 U.S. at 339. See note 1 supra.
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The final consideration is whether Sniadach's invalidation of a prejudgment wage garnishment can be extended to include other forms of
personal property. The Court expressly stated that "[W]e deal here with
wages - a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system."17 2 Although a narrow reading of Sniadach would restrict
its holding to wages, a plausible interpretation of the case's logic would
extend its impact not only to wages but also to what may, despite the
admitted vagueness of the term, be characterized as the necessities of
as homes, clothing, automobiles, and
life, including such tangible 7assets
3
appliances.
household
various
In contravention of this position creditors would contend that Sniadach
should not apply in circumstances other than those involving wages. Their
argument would be that the inherently unique nature of wages makes them
necessary for the day-to-day living of the wage earner's family but that
no other property is similarly critical. 74 Although wages are critical, this
alone should not compel a different treatment of other types of property
for it should be clear that the attachment or seizure of any asset necessary
to the debtor's immediate well-being exerts the same type of pressure as
does wage garnishment. 75 Thus the seizure of a bank account, an automobile or, for that matter, any of the debtor's everyday usable property
can still force him to accede to creditor demands, and eliminate the
76
opportunity to contest the validity of a creditor's claim.
In addition to the question of due process, it can be argued that the
Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure denies low income consumers equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.77 Even if these individuals realize that the opportunity is
72. 395 U.S. at 340.
73. Note, Some Implications of Sniadach,supra note 58, at 949-50.
74. See Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra note 58, at 847.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Another constitutional issue present in a confession of judgment situation is
that of full faith and credit. An in-depth analysis of this area of the law is beyond
the scope of this Note, but for a thorough treatment of some of the conflicts of law
problems which arise when confessed judgments are involved in a full faith and
credit situation, see Hopson, supra note 8, at 143-56.
A basic constitutional problem raised by the confession of judgment practice,
but not touched upon by the Swarb decision, is the question whether full faith and
credit applies where a plaintiff who has legally obtained a confessed judgment in
one state, seeks to have that judgment enforced in another state whose laws either
expressly or impliedly prohibit the practice. This conflicts of law problem, as yet
undecided by the United States Supreme Court, was raised recently in the case of
Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1969). See generally Note, Cognovit Judgments Under Fire in New York, supra
note 8. In this case the New York Court of Appeals reversed its traditional stand
on the full faith and credit to be accorded a confessed judgment and refused to
enforce two such judgments originally rendered in Pennsylvania. The court grounded
its holding upon the rationale that such judgments are not "judicial proceedings"
within the meaning of full faith and credit. In reaching this conclusion, the New
York court noted that there was no exercise of the discretion "usually associated
with judicial proceedings," and that confessed judgments do not present any controversy for judicial resolution, but are merely personal acts upon which the court
places its imprimatur. 25 N.Y.2d at 230, 250 N.E.2d at 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
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585

available to file petitions to strike or open judgment to stay the sheriff
sale, the prohibitive cost of such proceedings will act as an impediment.
The $300 required for attorney's fees for preparing petitions,78 the $90 in
Sheriff's costs and the additional expense of taking depositions effectively
eliminates any meaningful opportunity that the low-income consumer might
have to prevent the sale of his property.7 9 It seems reasonable to conclude
that a consuner who cannot afford to meet his installment payments
will be unable to initiate the expensive proceedings necessary to open
judgment.
Although numerous Supreme Court decisions establish that any
criminal procedure erecting an economic impasse against the poor and
hindering their exercise of a fundamental right violates equal protection, °
the question arises whether this rationale can be applied to afford the
poor equal access to the courts in civil matters. 8 ' Although the opinions
in Swarb and Sniadach were predicated exclusively upon due process
analysis, 82 it is arguable that hidden in Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in
the latter case was an "equal protection argument based on the consideration that the challenged Wisconsin procedure on its customary operative
effect discriminated against the poor."8' 3 Since such a construction of
Sniadach is plausible,8 4 although perhaps premature,85 it follows that the
The problem of enforcement of judgments by confession becomes compounded when

it is observed that other states, though outlawing the practice themselves, nevertheless
would enforce another state's judgments without question under full faith and credit.
See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (1959); Texas Scott Paper Co. v.
Johnson, 406 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). The enforcement of the judgment
therefore turns upon the fortuitous location of either the debtor or his property.
Thus, the time seems ripe for a final and uniform determination by the United States
Supreme Court.
78. See Comment, supra note 19, at 120 & n.29; Note, supra note 36, at 419
n.179; but see 314 F. Supp. at 1096, where the court described the minimum attorneys'
fees to be $150.
79. See Comment, supra note 19, at 120 & n.29; Note, supra note 36, at 419 n.179.
80. Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) ; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) ; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
81. It seems that only one decision, Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296
N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968), has extended the protection of the equal protection clause
to the civil area. See note 45 supra.
82. It should be noted, however, that the equal protection issue was a major
argument advanced in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 18-23, Swarb v. Lennox,
314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), and was the principal argument presented in
the Sniadach case in an amicus brief. Brief for Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 9-17, Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
83. Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, supra note 58 at 954. See also
Michelman, Foreward, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term: On Protecting the Poor
through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969), for a discussion of
the proximity between recent substantive due process and equal protection decisions.
84. The issue is discussed in depth in Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, supra
note 58 at 954-64. See generally Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation,
66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322 (1966).
85. See Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, supra note 58, at 962-63. This
commentator, after analyzing the decisions and dicta in Supreme Court and lower
federal and state court cases, concludes that the weight of authority militates against
any wholesale application of the equal protection clause to civil litigation in the
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operation of the Pennsylvania confession of judgment practice, restraining
the ability of the poor to gain access to the courts, violates equal protection.
The elimination or restricted application of the confession of judgment
procedure will have the practical effect of improving the legal process in the
eyes of the Pennsylvania consumer. Absent the Swarb decision, the system
invites abuse by providing creditors with relatively unfettered means of
instituting fraudulent claims against their debtors in an atmosphere of
economic coercion.86 Many of the poor may be forced to lose their homes
or personal possessions or forced to pay invalid claims with additional
penalities and "lawyer's fees" to save these possessions. The costs of
being subjected to the legal process are high, and in addition to the direct
costs, including court costs and attorney fees, there are the added personal
consequences of deprivation of property and the resultant hardship that
naturally follows.

87

Those who favor the confession of judgment practice take the position
that this procedure serves the beneficial purpose of avoiding the delay
and court congestion that is present particularly in large cities, since the
absence of notice and a hearing greatly decreases both the congestion
and the necessity for more judges and process servers. 88 Although these
are very real problems, they are not adequate reasons to continue a practice
once it is found to be unfair and unjust. Faced with a similar argument,
the Supreme Court has recognized that "the State is not without weapons
to minimize these increased costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources can be reduced by developing procedures for
prompt . . . hearings and by skillful use of personnel and facilities. ' 80
Others argue that the process saves attorney's fees since there are no
complaints, no defenses and little chance that the court might decide that
the obligation is not owing.90 These proponents overlook the fact that it is
the defendant consumer who must invariably incur the expense of
counsel to open judgment and it is this defendant who often can least
afford to bear such cost. Moreover, in a consumer transaction an important
reason for the debtor's default may be non-conformity of the goods.
In the final analysis, the Swarb case indicates the court's realization
that longevity alone does not make for constitutionality. The fact that
forty-seven of the fifty states disfavor the confession of judgment
practice attests to its inherent weaknesses, and despite the decision's
limitations, the Swarb court has taken a significant step in the modernization and improvement of archaic Pennsylvania law in this area.
presently foreseeable future. But it is pointed out that although a mass extension
of the equal protection clause is not immediately perceivable, this does not necessarily
mean that there will not be at least some movement toward a limited extension of
this protection to the civil area.
86. See Comment, supra note 19, at 122.
87. See Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts. 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 879, 896-97 (1967).
88. Hopson, supra note 8, at 123.
89. Goldberg v. Kelly, 398 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
90. See Comment, supra note 19, at 123-24.
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On direct appeal, the Supreme Court is now faced with the very question presented to the district court, 91 that is, whether the Pennsylvania
statutes and rules permitting a debtor to sign an agreement authorizing
a court clerk or any attorney, upon the debtor's default, to appear and enter
judgment against him without notice to the debtor, violates the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. It is submitted that the Swarb decision,
by making economic distinctions a basis for the applicability of confessions
of judgment, is as unconstitutional as the unconstitutional practice it was
attempting to resolve. Therefore, the Supreme Court should modify the
district court's holding and find this procedure violative of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause without imposing a $10,000 limitation.
Frank J. Ferro

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE DUE PROCESS
REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING To PRECEDE THE
TERMINATION OF BENEFITS To WELFARE RECIPIENTS.
CLAUSE

Goldberg v. Kelly (U.S. 1970)
Twenty New York City residents who received welfare benefits under
federally and state sponsored assistance programs' initiated this suit in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2 alleging that the

public welfare assistance termination procedures employed by both the
City and the State of New York were violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 3 It was argued that these procedures did
91. Appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3100 (U.S. Sept. 15, 1970)

(No. 538).

1. The federally sponsored program was classified as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). Social Security Act, tit. IV. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44
(1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970). This is a categorical assistance program,
supported by federal funds and administered by the states as provided by the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964). The New York State
program is designated as Home Relief. See N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW §§ 343-62
(McKinney Supp. 1970), amending N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §§ 343-62 (McKinney
1966). Home Relief is a general assistance program financed solely by the state and
local political entities. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §§ 157-66 (McKinney 1966), as
amended (Supp. 1968). For an in depth discussion, see note 20 infra.
2. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3. In order for the due process clause to apply it is necessary to prove state
action. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678-79 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). It must also be ascertained that the interest of the individual is sufficient to deserve constitutional protection. The state action requirement is fulfilled
by the mere termination of the welfare funds. The Supreme Court provides the
answer to the problem of finding a substantial interest by insisting that all that is
needed is state involvement with an individual in which the state deprives the individual of either rights or benefits to which he is entitled. Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). See also Graham, Public
Assistance: The Right To Receive; The Obligation To Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv.
451 (1968); Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. L. REv.
266 (1949).
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not afford proper notice to the terminated recipient nor did they provide
any provision requiring a hearing to be held prior to the termination of
these benefits. 4 Injunctive relief was sought to prevent the withdrawal
of the financial aid until a hearing could first be held. 5
During the course of the litigation, the city and state amended these
statutory regulations and adopted practices requiring that notice of
termination be communicated to the recipient as well as demanding that
a review be held prior to the termination of payments. These new
procedures were, nonetheless, also challenged as being constitutionally
defective.6 The district court recognized the inadequacy of the new procedural safeguards as employed by the city and ordered that the procedures
be made to conform with the requirements of due process.'

On appeal, 8 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the district

court's decree, holding that due process requires an adequate hearing prior
to the termination of public assistance funds, but that the pre-termination

hearing need not assume the characteristics of a judicial or quasi-judicial

body.9 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Traditionally, the egalitarian concept of welfare has been based on the
sole criterion of need. 10 The determination as to who qualifies for financial
assistance has been left to the judgment of the local and state welfare
administrative officials."' Once the decision has been reached that the re4. 294 F. Supp. at 905.

S. Since plaintiffs sought injunctive relief restraining the New York
Department of Social Services from the enforcement of a statewide statute
on the ground
that it was unconstitutional, a three judge court was properly convened
pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
6. The new regulations were adopted by the State of New York in an
effort
to make the welfare hearings more equitable. Under the original plan
the recipient
was entitled to appear personally before an official and orally present evidence
with
the aid of an attorney. However, the plan was unacceptable to the City
York. Thus, option (b) evolved. Option (b) only permitted the recipient of New
a written report as to why his aid should not be discontinued. The original to submit
program,
option (a), was adopted by the State of New York, with the exception
New York
City which adopted option (b). See 18 NEW YORK CODE OF RULES AND of
REGULATIONS
§ 351.26 (1968) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C.R.R] for text of both options.
The
plaintiffs in Kelly directed their objections at option (b). Nonetheless,
maintained that option (a) was constitutionally insufficient. See Goldberg they also
v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 259 (1970).
7. 294 F. Supp. at 906.
8. Both the State and City of New York were joined as defendants
in the
original action. Only the City of New York appealed. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S.
254, 261 (1970).
9. Id. at 264, 266.
10. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8 2.1(a) (1) (1968), states:
Public assistance and care shall be granted only so long and in such form
and
amount as is necessitated by the needs of the recipient in light of his resources.
The State of New York does proclaim that an individual whose assets
are
substantial enough to sustain himself for a period greater than three months
is not
qualified for public assistance. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351 (c) (3) (i) (a).
It has been estimated that one out of every twenty citizens is a recipient
of

some sort of aid.

STATISTICS, REPORT

NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

A2 5 (1969).

11. See 42 U.S.C.
for welfare, see Reich,
Nature of the Right to
Welfare From Below:
L. REV. 370 (1966).

§ 1302 (1964). For a detailed discussion of the requirements
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Taylor, The
Public Assistance, 36 SOCIAL SERVICE REv. 265 (1962) ; Briar,
Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54 CALIF.
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quired standard of need is present in any given case, the particular individual or family then becomes eligible to receive the monthly payments.' 2
Periodic scrutiny by the welfare agency as to the continuation of the
required need is part of the administrative program.' s If the agency concludes that the recipient no longer possesses the qualifications to be eligible
for public assistance payments, the question arises whether the payments
should be immediately suspended or whether they are to continue until
a fair hearing may be arranged to decide the merits of the agency determination.' 4 Similarly, the problem of what due process safeguards are to
be applied to the hearing must be confronted. The judiciary has, on
numerous occasions, attempted to answer these inquiries, but has failed to
reach any consistent results. This lack of judicial unanimity is evidenced
by recent decisions. In Wheeler v. Montgomery,15 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that an informal
conference with a social worker prior to the termination of benefits is
adequate to comply with due process requirements. In Camerena v.
Department of Public Welfare,16 however, the Arizona Court of Appeals
held that there must be a hearing before financial assistance may be
discontinued. However, in direct contradiction of these cases is McCall
v. Shapiro17 where the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut rejected the necessity for any pre-termination hearing or prior
conference before the suspension of public assistance payments.
The inability of the courts to establish workable guidelines in the area
of welfare administration may be attributed to the fact that the protections
of procedural due process have only recently been extended to welfare
proceedings. The delay in instituting these safeguards into the framework
of the welfare system can be traced to the attitude that welfare is
12. Prior to the 1 930's the federal government participated only slightly in the
public assistance program. With the passing of the Social Security Act in 1935,
however, there was a marked increase in the availability of federal funds. Despite this
increase in federal participation, the administration of the welfare system remained
primarily in the hands of state and local officials. Wickham, Public Welfare Administration: Quest for a Workable Solution, 58 GEo. L.J. 46, 49-50 (1969).
13. Officials of the local agencies make original and subsequent studies of the
recipients economic status to determine the eligibility of the individual. Generally, the
recipient himself is the prime source of information, but, on occasion, collateral

sources are relied upon to provide confirming or adverse information. See Wedemeyer
& Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1966).
14. If a negative decision is reached by local welfare officials administering the
federal categorical assistance programs, the recipient, upon request, is afforded a
hearing before officials of the state welfare agency. Such a procedure is required in
all states under this federally sponsored plan. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4)

(Supp. V,

1970) (AFDC). For the New York City regulation, see 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 84.6 (1968).
For a discussion of categorical assistance, see note 20 infra.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has set forth the procedures to be applied at these hearings. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, §§ 6000-500
(1969)

[hereinafter cited as HEW].

15. 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
16. 9 Ariz. App. 120, 449 P.2d 957 (1969).
17. 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 1968).
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synonymous with charity' s and to the ever present controversy over the
"right-privilege" dichotomy. 19 The proponents of these attitudes remain
responsible for much of the disparity that presently' exists within the
the judiciary.
Through the promulgation of federal regulations an attempt has been
made to establish procedures to be uniformly applied under the federally
subsidized categorical assistance programs. 20 Included in these regulations
are the procedures that are to be adhered to by the state administrative
agencies for the termination of a recipient's aid. It has often proven to be
the case, however, that the existing regulations are either abused or ignored
by the state agencies. 21 The federal regulations do not vest rights in the
individual recipients, but instead, delegate authority to the state agencies
to exercise their discretion in applying the provisions of the regulations.
Therefore, under these regulations, the recipient has no enforceable right
to a prior hearing or any other procedural safeguards. Consequently, a
terminated recipient who bases his claim for reinstatement solely on the
18. For an expression of the attitude that welfare is to be correlated with charity,
see Wilkie v. O'Connor, 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See

generally Burris & Fessler, Constitutional Due Process Hearing Requirements in the
Administration of Public Assistance: The District of Columbia Experience, 16 AM.
U.L. REV. 199 (1967); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
19. This argument stems from the attitude that welfare payments are a
"privilege," not a "right." It maintains that the recipient does not have a right to
receive public assistance payments since the financial aid received is given as a mere
gratuity, with no rights attached. It is held that the government institutes welfare
programs out of benevolence for the needy, but not because it is obliged to do so.
The government, the argument continues, can institute such programs when it so
desires as well as terminate the program when it feels the need. Since the individual
recipient has no right to such aid, he consequently, has no "right" to contest the
suspension of the payments. See generally Comment, Withdrawal of Public Welfare:
The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L.J. 1234 (1966).
In addition, the proponents of the idea that welfare is a "privilege" insist that
the safeguards of due process are not applicable because there is no denial of any
"right." Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608 (1960) (dictum).
20. For a viewing of the statutory components of the categorical assistance
programs, see Social Security Act, tit. IV, AFDC, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964), as
amended (Supp. V, 1970) ; Old Age Assistance, Social Security Act, tit. I, 42 U.S.C.
§8 301-06 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970); Aid to the Blind, Social Security
Act, tit. X, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970) ; Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled Social Security Act, tit. XIV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55
(1964), as amended (Supp. V, 190).
Public assistance in the United States assumes the role of either general or
categorical assistance. General assistance programs are funded totally by local and
state governments. Prior to the Social Security Act of 1935 general assistance
programs were the only existing schemes that would provide aid to the impoverished.
With the inception of the Social Security Act, however, categorical assistance programs emerged as the primary means of aiding the needy. These programs are
supported by grants-in-aid from the federal government. In order to receive federal
aid the states must submit plans for the classification of the needy and for the distribution of the funds to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Despite
the need for the states to conform with certain minimal federal standards, the federal
governments does allow the states to administer the programs as they deem appropriate. See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLum.
L. REV. 84, 85 (1967).
21. The federal regulations are not to be construed as being directory, but
instead, as being mandatory on the state agency. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
See Note, supra note 20; Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right,
46 TEXAS L. REv. 223 (1967).
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rights granted him under the federal regulations will probably not be able
22
to satisfy that claim in either the state or federal courts.
In an administrative proceeding the right to procedural safeguards is
not an absolute right.23 A determination of which protections, if any, are
to be applied to an administrative hearing is dependent upon the very
purpose of the proceeding. 24 This determination is based on the consideration of what governmental functions are involved as well as the private
interests that will be affected.2 5 In the instant case, however, the Goldberg.
Court avoided this approach and affimatively asserted that welfare hearings are of the administrative type and that they do require the protections
26
of due process.
Before addressing itself to the constitutional issue of whether due
process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of public
welfare assistance, the Court found it necessary to discuss the applicability
of the "right-privilege" dichotomy to the solution of this problem. Citing
Shapirov. Thompson,27 the Court dismissed the propriety of this distinction
by stating that such a "constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an
argument that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and not a
'right'. '28 The Court's position concerning the "right-privilege" dichotomy
would seem to have the effect of placing a limitation upon the exercise of
22. For an understanding of the ineffectiveness of the federal regulations as
applied to both state and federal jurisdictions, see Comment, The Constitutional
Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements
of a Prior Hearing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 112, 117-18 (1969).
23. See U.S. v. Irwin, 127 U.S. 125 (1888).
24. A categorization of the type of proceedings is first necessary before the
applicable rights may be determined. Administrative proceedings are divided into two
classifications, legislative and adjudicative.
A legislative hearing is solely an educational proceeding. The concern of the
tribunal is not with an individual's activity or conduct, but instead focuses on some
general area of the law. The proceeding may be held to aid in the construction of
new policy or in the formulation of a new statute. The hearing has no immediate
effect on any individual and the tribunal has no authority to institute any type
of sanction.
Adjudicatory hearings confront and attempt to resolve the issues related to
an individual's conduct in a certain legal area. The decision of the officials results
in the application of legal consequences to the parties involved. In this type of hearing
the individual is often the best source of information, thus a personal appearance is
usually demanded. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 487-97 (1951).
It is only the adjudicatory hearings that normally require the full protections
of due process. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239
U.S. 441 (1915). Welfare hearings have been defined as being adjudicatory in nature.
However, the denial of due process has been affirmed in adjudicatory hearings where
the interest of the state is felt to be superior to that of the individual. Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (allowing the seizure of mislabeled food) ; North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (allowing the summary seizure of allegedly spoiled food).
25. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440-42 (1960).
26. 397 U.S. at 264, 266-71.
27. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The right-privilege consideration now endures in only
a few limited areas. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (holding a suspension of
deportation is not a matter of right but a matter of grace) ; Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (holding that
government employment is neither property nor contract within the protection of
due process).
28. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See note 19 supra.
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welfare agency discretion by removing the benevolent-gratuity argument
as a basis for insulating agency action from due process requirements.
The principal issue that confronted the Supreme Court in the instant
case was whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
required that an evidentiary hearing be granted to a welfare recipient
prior to the withdrawal

of

his assistance

payments. 29 Mr. Justice

Brennan, writing for the majority, clearly indicated the Court's determination to implant the public welfare assistance procedures with appropriate procedural due process safeguards. According to the Court, an
order for the cessation of public assistance payments may become effective
only upon the completion of an adequate hearing. 0 As a result, the
position maintained by New York City officials that the requirement of a
subsequent fair hearing combined with prior informal written review was
clearly rejected as being insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.
The Court, in reaching its conclusion, deemed it appropriate to employ
a balancing approach to assess the relative merit of each party's position.
This approach recognizes that the rights granted by the Constitution are
not absolute, and that those rights may be abridged to accommodate a vital
public interest.8 1 In applying this approach to the instant case the Court
had to determine whether the rights of the recipients in avoiding summary
termination of their benefits outweighed the need for the City of New
York to avoid the expenditure of revenues related to pre-termination
32
hearings.
In accordance with the above mentioned balancing test, the petitioner
contended that a denial of a prior evidentiary hearing was not a usurpation
of the individual's due process. The petitioner reasoned that the preservation of the recipients' rights was subordinate to the interest of New York
City in conserving its funds. 3 This contention was rejected by the Court
after examining the hardships that such a denial might impose upon the
welfare recipient. The Court noted that an erroneous suspension of
funds would inflict a substantial, if not an insurmountable, burden upon the
already impoverished. 4 The individual, or family, so affected would be
deprived "of the very means by which to live. . .. -"5 The strength of the
29. 397 U.S. at 260.
30. Id. at 264.
31. P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 112-13 (1962).
32. The current judicial trend implies that the right to a hearing is based not
on the right-privilege distinction, but on the balancing of the interests of the individual
against those of the public. See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150
(5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
33. 397 U.S. at 265.
34. The effect of a wrongful discontinuance of welfare becomes apparent when,
for example, the Illinois eligibility requirements are examined. Under the AFDC
program in Illinois, a recipient, in order to qualify, must dispose of all assets in
excess of one month's welfare benefits. Thus, if that recipient is illegally terminated,
he will be unable to provide for the children dependent upon these funds. See BUREAU
OF FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND, WELFARE,
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY

ACT, GENERAL PROVISION

35. 397 U.S. at 264.

116 (Public Assistance Report No. 50, 1964).
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petitioner's contention is even further diminished when, as one commentator has observed, it is realized that:
[T]he Supreme Court has
terest in reducing expenses
justification for the denial
not entitled to any weight

held in numerous cases that when the inand in conserving tax revenues is the sole
of procedural protection, that interest is
in the constitutional balancing process. 86

Despite the holding of the Court on this issue, it did recognize that the
petitioner's assertion was deserving of some consideration. The realities
of the welfare system do, indeed, necessitate an awareness of the expenses involved since the requirement of a prior hearing does place an
extra burden upon the City's treasury. The Court, however, determined
that such an added burden is not to be counterbalanced by a denial of
due process. 8 7 Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that such a required procedure will not only increase the cost of the proceedings, but might also act
as an incentive for ineligible recipients to request the evidentiary hearing.
By making the demand for the prior hearing, the ineligible recipient
may insure himself of the continuation of his financial assistance, at
least until such time as the hearing is completed. 8 Mr. Justice Black, in
his dissenting opinion, indicated his awareness of this problem as well as
his belief in the inappropriateness of extending the pre-termination
hearing requirement to the welfare system when he stated:
I do not believe there is any provision in our Constitution that should
thus paralyze government's efforts to protect itself against making
payments to people who are not entitled to them. 89
36. Comment, supra note 3, at 127, citing Willner v. Committee on Character
and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ; Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; Goldsmith
v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
37. 397 U.S. at 266. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(holding that the interest in protecting revenues is valid, but is not to offset rights
granted under due process).
38. The Nixon Administration opposes the continuation of welfare payments
until a prior evidentiary hearing is held. It is felt by this administration that payments maintained after the finding of alleged ineligibility, but before the hearing,
result in a severe drain on the available funds for eligible recipients. See Washington
Post, Sept. 11, 1969, § A, at 4, col. 5.
As a means of alleviating the possibility of payments being made to the
ineligible, the Nixon Administration has proposed a negative income tax system that
would replace the present welfare system. This program would guarantee a basic
minimum income to all families. See Speech by President Nixon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9,
1969, at 1, col. 8.
39. 397 U.S. at 275. It appears, however, that Mr. Justice Black has ignored
the individual recipient who is entitled to public welfare payments, but who has been
wrongfully terminated. The imposition of this attitude would inflict severe hardships
on those legally qualified to receive the aid.
Mr. Justice Black based his dissent on the proposition that there existed
nowhere in the Constitution, including the due process clause, a provision that could
be construed as demanding an evidentiary hearing to be afforded to welfare recipients
prior to the suspension of their funds. He states that the majority gave the due
process clause an overly broad interpretation and used this provision to manifest
their own subjective standards of fairness. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
71-72 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
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In response to this allegation, the majority maintained that there need
not be a substantial increase in the amount of funds expended by the welfare agencies. The Court submitted that through the implementation of the
proper procedures and the deployment of welfare personnel in a studied
manner that costs could be minimized. Such a program would require,
among other things, that hearings be held as quickly as possible after the
issuance of the termination notice and that an adequate number of
officials be provided to preside over the hearings. 40 In addition, it would
seem feasible for the state to consider the utilization of appropriate
41
statutes in an effort to recoup payments made to ineligible recipients.
In considering the necessity for a pre-termination hearing, the Court
clarified an apparent misunderstanding concerning the need for both
a prior informal hearing and a subsequent fair hearing to satisfy due
process requirements. This misunderstanding is attributed to two sources:
(1) the holding of the District Court in Kelly v. Wyman that a hearing
prior to the withdrawal of aid was necessary; and (2) the demand of
the Social Security Act that the states must provide a "fair hearing" before the state welfare agency. 42 The factor which distinguishes the two
hearings is that the prior hearing is held on the local level whereas the
"fair hearing" is held on the state level.
In concluding that due process does not require two hearings, the
majority maintained that: (1) the two-pronged procedure was unduly
burdensome ;43 and (2) due process only requires that a hearing be
40. See Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare
Cases, 37 FORD. L. REV. 604, 609 (1969). Under the New York regulations, the
recipient is given seven days notice before the termination of his benefits. It is
conceivable that, with greater efficiency on the part of the welfare agency, the required
hearings could be held within this seven day period. If this were accomplished, the
additional expense of holding the hearings would be greatly reduced. See Comment,
note 22 supra.
The states are also eligible for federal subsidies in making payments to a
recipient who is waiting for a determination on his prior hearing. HEW, HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC AsSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, § 6500(b) (1968).
41. The Court dismisses recoupment of payments as a feasible means of reducing
the costs of the welfare programs. However, recoupment is a very real and viable
tool at the disposal of the state. See N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 105 (McKinney
1966) (state may claim insurance policies held by a recipient of public assistance);
N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 104 (McKinney Supp. 1970), amending (McKinney
1966) (state can recover property from a person discovered to have property) ; N.Y.
Soc. WELFARE LAW § 360 (McKinney 1966) (state may take real property of legally
responsible relatives). (The title SOCIAL WELFARE LAW was amended to SOCIAL
SERVICES LAW in 1967 by § 1 thereof (McKinney Supp. 1970)).

For an illustration of successful recoupment, see Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp.
853, 855-58 (1968).
In addition, for AFDC or other categorical assistance programs, federal
contributions may be obtained up to fifty percent of the cost of benefits paid pending
review of a recipient's case. See HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, pt. IV, 6500 (1968).

42. See 33 ALBANY L. REV. 616, 626-27 (1969). See also note 43 infra.
43. The hearing required by due process need not take place at any specific time
as long as it has been completed before the order for the discontinuance of benefits
is effectuated. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage and Hour Div.,
312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941).
A proposal has been introduced that would allegedly satisfy the due process
requirements by establishing an informal conference, giving notice and the right to
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held prior to the termination of payments, and that such a hearing provide the minimum procedural safeguards. 4 4 The Court's reasoning in
ordering that only minimal safeguards be employed in the pre-termination hearing is based on a realization that a formal judicial proceeding would hinder the movement toward settlement of the controversy, as
well as detrimentally affect the probability of achieving a just determi45
nation.
In enumerating the minimum safeguards to be followed in the pretermination hearings, the Court initiated its discussion by insisting that
timely and adequate notice is an essential element. 46 The form of notice
employed in notifying the individuals of the discontinuance of their payments assumes a dual role - that of an official correspondence coupled
with a personal conference with the caseworker. 47 The Court stated that
in the instant case the means of providing the recipients with notice was
more than sufficient. 48 However, it was unable to react with similar certainty in considering the time period provided for in New York City of
seven days. 49 While not specifically declaring the regulation to be violative
appear personally, but not granting the other procedural protections, prior to the
demanded fair hearing. This conference would attempt to eliminate requests for a
fair hearing by those who obviously do not have a legitimate grievance. The conference, as the proposal states, is not designed to discourage those whose benefits
have been wrongly terminated, but only to discourage those who blatantly possess
characteristics that make them ineligible for welfare payments. Moreover, the impartial interviewer conducting the conference has at his disposal no power to suspend
payments or forbid a request for a fair hearing. Benefits would continue until the
fair hearing was completed, if it was so requested. See Wickham, supra note 12,
at 60-64.
44. The Court emphasized that only minimal procedural safeguards were required when it stated:
We ... recognize the importance of not imposing upon the States and the Federal
Government in this developing field of law any procedural requirements beyond
those demanded by rudimentary due process.
397 U.S. at 267.
45. The requirements of a formal judicial proceeding would have required various
formalities that would have excessively burdened the welfare agencies. One of the
main hopes in instituting the minimal requirements was to reduce the arbitrariness
that inevitably accompanies such a large scale program. For an in depth discussion,
see Comment, supra note 22, at 130-35.
46. Notice is a fundamental requirement of due process. Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951). See generally Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
47. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.26 (1968). The type of notice required to be given to
the recipient is important. Since many of the welfare recipients have had minimal
education, written notice, in and of itself, would not be proper. When combined with
a personal conference, however, in which the recipient is advised of his eligibility
problem as well as his rights, the due process requirement is satisfied. See Briar,
supra note 11, at 384-85; Cox, Families on Welfare in New York City, 6 WELFARE
IN REVIEW

22 (1968) ; Comment, supra note 21.

48. 397 U.S. at 268. The plaintiffs had originally objected to the means of notice
by stressing that the time period of seven days was insufficient in order to reply to
the charges. They also insisted that the exact reasons for termination were not
adequately outlined. 397 U.S. at 258.
49. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.26 (1968).
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of due process the majority did imply that such a period of notification
might, in some circumstances, be unconstitutional.5 °
Under alternative (b) of the State of New York's Welfare Regulations, which was adopted by the Department of Social Services of the
City of New York, the welfare recipient is denied the right to a personal
appearance upon the receipt of notice of termination.5 According to this
option, when the recipient chooses to contest the discontinuance of his
payments, he has only the right to submit a written statement in an
effort to convince the welfare officials of their error in withdrawing his
financial aid. 52 Such a regulation is inconsistent with the prevailing attitude that the right to a personal appearance is an essential requirement
of the due process clause. 53 The inadequacy of this regulation becomes
evident when it is considered that the average recipient lacks the
educational background that is necessary for the preparation of a meaningful written argument. 54 On this point the Court noted that:
[W]ritten submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument
to the
55
issues the decision maker appears to regard as important.
Thus, the Court concluded that the right to a personal appearance is an
indispensable requirement of due process.
Another safeguard that must be incorporated into the welfare hearing
format is the right to cross-examine those who have provided adverse testimony. The Court indicated that such a right is inherent in the concept of
procedural due process and, therefore, is a necessary component of the
welfare hearing.56 Similarly, the Court determined that the need to be
represented by counsel is implicit in the right to direct confrontation.5 7
In considering the appropriateness of legal representation at these informal pre-termination hearings, the majority concluded that counsel may
50. The Court stated:

[W]e are not prepared to say that the seven-day notice currently provided by

New York City is constitutionally insufficient per se, although there may be cases
where fairness would require a longer time to be given.

397 U.S. at 268.

51. See 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 351.26 (1968).
52. See note 6 supra.

See also Comment, supra note 39, at 613.

53. The opportunity to orally present evidence is a fundamental right. See Dixon

v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955); Standard
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
54. A survey taken of welfare mothers in New York City indicated that only
about one-half of them had ever reached high school, and of this group less than
twenty percent successfully completed four years at the secondary education level.

See Cox, supra note 46, at 24.
55. 397 U.S. at 269-70.
56. Id. The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is of primary
importance. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
957 (1963) ; Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
57. 397 U.S. at 270, citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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bc retained,5 8 since "counsel can help delineate the issues, present the
factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and
generally safeguard the interests of the recipient." 59
However, in spite of this apparent admission of the desirability of
recipient representation, the Court explicitly indicated that such a determination was not to be construed as demanding that counsel be provided
for the recipient, but only that an attorney may be retained, if the
recipient so desires. Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, suggests that the
same rationale used in determining that an advocate may be retained
could readily be employed to convince the Court of the necessity for appointed counsel. 60 While the majority emphasized that the presence of
counsel is an invaluable asset, they seem to have ignored the fact that
a destitute individual, unable to provide himself with the necessities of
life, would surely be unable to afford the luxury of counsel. This
apparent contradiction - the advantages of having adequate representation at the welfare hearing and the impossibility of such an acquisition leaves the Court vulnerable to the argument that without insuring the
presence of counsel, either retained or appointed, the recipient is deprived
of the fundamental vehicle for the protection of granted safeguards
thus rendering the pre-termination hearing a futility. 6'
To insure that the conclusion reached by the decision maker would
not constitute an arbitrary determination, the Court insisted on the formation of certain concrete standards. Among these is the requirement that
the decision be based solely on the evidence set forth at the hearing. 2
58. The Court stated:
[W]e do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing,
but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.

397 U.S. at 270.

However, the federal regulations require that participants of the categorical
assistance programs be provided with legal representation at the fair hearing. 45
C.F.R. § 205.10 (1970).
59. 397 U.S. at 270-71.
60. Mr. Justice Black, though not advocating the application of due process to the
welfare system, viewed the appointment of counsel as the logical extension of the
Court's opinion. Should such an action be taken by the Court, he continued, the
granting to the recipients of full administrative protections and finally judicial review
would not be far from fruition. To these extensions he was vehemently opposed.
Id. at 278-79.
61. Some states did not allow the recipients the right to retained or appointed
counsel. This decree, in effect, permits organizations such as the Welfare Rights
Organization (WRO) and Community Legal Services (CLS) to accompany and
advise the recipient at the time of the fair hearing. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that these organizations, because of the lack of both finances and personnel,
can provide counsel for only a small number of those who request representation.
Therefore, despite the willingness of these organizations to provide the needed representation, the great majority of welfare recipients remain without counsel.
It has been argued that by providing recipients with counsel the system will
become overly burdened, harming both the state agency and the recipient. Such an
action would, in effect, change the hearings from an informal conference to an
adverserial proceeding. Such a transformation would result in placing added demands
on an already burdened agency as well as causing greater delays in the decision
making process. See Comment, supra note 22, at 137.
62. 397 U.S. at 271, citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937);
United States & ICC v. Abilene & S. Ry., 265 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1924).
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Furthermore, the decision maker must be one who has not taken part,
to any great extent, in the previous formulation and determination of
the case. This does not, however, exclude an individual who has in some
remote way been associated with the recipient's file.63 Ideally, the most
suitable method for avoiding decision-maker bias would be to have a
completely disinterested official determine the status of the recipient. 64
The-decree of the Goldberg Court represents only an initial effort
toward the needed refinement of the law applicable to the welfare system.
When viewing this decision with the earlier decisions of Shapiro v. Thompson 65 and King v. Smith, 66 it becomes apparent that the Court has finally
come to recognize that public assistance has evolved into a discipline deserving its own rules and considerations. While this enlightenment is
encouraging there still remain numerous concepts that demand further
clarification.
As previously mentioned, the Court soundly rejected the "right-privilege" distinction. In so doing, however, it has not announced what theory
has been substituted in its place. It seems that a new concept has been introduced which is a unique property concept conceived in response to the
need to classify government largess incapable of being categorized as
either a "right" or a "privilege." The Court has referred to this concept as
an entitlement.6 7 An entitlement is the caption used in describing the theory
upon which welfare benefits are distributed to those who meet established
statutory requirements. The Court, although recognizing the existence of
this concept, has not yet attempted to explain its applicability to the welfare system. As a result, the effect of the entitlement concept upon both
the welfare system as an entity and its individual participants remains
unclear. This problem necessitates a determination of the permanency
of any program classified as an entitlement, i.e., whether by a mere
change in legislative priorities or in the event of a national emergency
the program could be summarily terminated.
In addition, concern exists over those areas within the welfare structure that were untouched by the Goldberg rationale. As the dissent of Mr.
Chief Justice Burger aptly illustrates, there is doubt as to whether a
recipient is to be afforded the safeguards of due process when his
financial assistance is merely reduced, though not totally terminated.68
The majority also did not see fit to determine whether an applicant, as
opposed to a recipient, for welfare assistance, upon rejection, may have
63. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955).
64. It has been ordered that an individual assuming the dual role of a judicial
and investigative officer cannot be called upon to render an impartial
decision. Such
an action would constitute a denial of due process protections. See
Wasson v.
Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967); Won Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339
U.S. 33, 34 (1950).
65. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
66. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
67. For a complete discussion of this new property concept, see Reich, supra
note 18. See also Reich, supra note 11.
68. 397 U.S. at 284-85.
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recourse to procedural due process. 69 Finally, the new federal regulations
governing the welfare system allow the terminated recipient certain rights
that the Court has deemed inappropriate to the welfare hearings. 70 For
these reasons, the question of what constitutes procedural due process
in the administration of welfare programs requires further explanation.
In the final analysis, the necessity for the Supreme Court's consideration of the constitutional problems in the area of welfare administration
cannot be controverted. Despite the shortcomings of this decision, the
standard contemplated by the Court does provide the recipient with a
means of opposing arbitrary action by the state and local agencies. Furthermore, it provides hope, not only to those receiving aid under categorical
assistance programs, but more importantly, to those who qualify under
the state financed general assistance classification. 71
Robert I. Trainor
69. Id.
70. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1970).
71. Those who received aid under the programs solely funded by state and local
governments were, prior to this decision, virtually unprotected from state abuse and
summary termination. As a result of this decision, the recipients of general assistance
are entitled to the same minimal due process safeguards as those who receive payments under the federally sponsored programs. See Comment, supra note 22, at 136-40.
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